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Unfair Trade Practices and Unfair Methods of Competition
in North Carolina: Treble Damages and the
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
North Carolina General Statutes section 75-1.11 has been the "center-

piece" of the law of unfair trade practices since its enactment in 1969.2 Unlike
its federal counterpart, section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 3 sec-

tion 75-1.1 is enforceable in a private damage action brought by an aggrieved
competitor or consumer, 4 and damages awarded in a private action brought
pursuant to section 75-16 are trebled automatically. 5 To establish a violation
of section 75-1.1, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant engaged in "unfair

methods of competition" or "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in or affecting commerce. 6 Rather than enumerating a list of illegal acts, practices, and
I. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1981) provides that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." The original version of§ 75-1.1(a) provided that "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby
declared unlawful." Act of June 12, 1969, ch. 833, § 1, 1969 N.C. SEss. LAWS 930. This version
was amended in 1977. Act of June 27, 1977, ch. 747, §§ 1-2, 1977 N.C. SEss. LAWS 984. This
amendment conformed § 75-1.1 to the exact wording of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976). Although the justification for the amendment was not made explicit,
the timing of the amendment suggests that the legislature was responding to the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in State ex. rel. Edmisten v. J.C. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 233 S.E.2d
895 (1977), which had distinguished the scope of the North Carolina and Federal Trade Commission Act provisions. See Aycock, North CarolinaLaw on Antitrust and Consumer Protection, 60
N.C.L. REv. 207, 210 (1982); see also Comment, The North CarolinaConsumer ProtectionAct of
1977, 56 N.C.L. REv. 547, 548 nn.7-8 (1978).
2. Aycock, supra note 1, at 210-11.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982).
4. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1981). Section 75-16 expressly provides a private cause of
action to any person, firm, or corporation injured as a result of any act in violation of § 75-1.1.
If any person shall be injured or the business of any person, firm, or corporation shall be
broken up, destroyed or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other person,
firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such person, firm or
corporation so injured shall have a right of action on account of such injury done, and if
damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.
A private cause of action under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act has been rejected
by a great majority of the courts. See Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1981); Fulton
v. Hecht, 580 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1978), reh'g denied, 585 F.2d 520, cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981
(1979); Alfred Dunhill, Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974); Holloway v.
Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also 4 CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES, § 24.01 n.22 (1983). But cf., Guernsey v. Rich
Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
5. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (1981). For text of§ 75-16, seesupra note 4. In Marshall v.
Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981), the court stated:
Absent statutory language making trebling discretionary with the trial judge, we must
conclude that the Legislature intended trebling of any damages to be automatic once a
violation is shown. To rule otherwise would produce the anomolous result of recognizing that although G.S. 75-1.1 creates a cause of action broader than traditional common
law actions, G.S. 75-16 limits the availability of any remedy to cases where some recovery at common law would probably also lie.
Id. at 547, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (1981). For text of§ 75-1.1(a), seesupra note 1. The statute
has two components: an unfair-methods-of-competition component and an unfair-or-deceptive-

1130

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 62

methods of competition, the general assembly decided "that the most useful

tool that could be made available ..
operative language of Section

5."7

to stop fraud and deception was the

Thus, the general assembly followed Con-

gress' definition, "advisedly adopt[ing] a phrase which.

. .

does not 'admit of

precise definition but the meaning and application of which must be arrived at

by what [the Supreme Court] elsewhere has called "the gradual process of
judicial inclusion and exclusion." '

"28

Because of the potential for enormous liability under this mandatory
treble damage provision and the uncertainty surrounding the precise boundaries of section 75-1.1, a number of defendants have challenged the constitutionality of section 75-16 as applied to section 75-1.1 on the grounds of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine.9 This note will analyze the application of the
acts-or-practices component. To understand the analysis applied by the courts when interpreting
a claim under § 75-1.1, "Itlhe unfair-method-of-competition component should be examined separately from the unfair-or-deceptive-acts-or-practices component." Aycock, supra note I, at 217.
The unfair-method-of-competition component derives its meaning from interpretations of § 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act and the North Carolina common law. In Harrington Mfg.
Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 38 N.C. App. 393, 400, 248 S.E.2d 739, 744 (1978), disc. rev. denied, 296
N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 469 (1979), the court of appeals stated that, "the fair or unfair nature of
particular conduct is to be judged by viewing it against the background of actual human experience and by determining its intended and actual effects upon others." The court cautioned putative defendants "to exercise care not to step over the necessarily vague but nonetheless real
boundary line dividing fair conduct from foul which the court from time to time may be called
upon to draw." Harrington, 38 N.C. App. at 404, 248 S.E.2d at 745 (emphasis added).
Although unfair methods of competition historically have been the most fertile ground for
litigation, the rise in the consumer movement and increased state consumer protection activities
have focused increasing attention on the unfair-or-deceptive-acts-or-practices component. See
Comment, The Trouble with Trebles: What Violates G.S. 75-1.1?, 5 CAMPBELL L. REV. 199 (1983).
In Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981), a consumer action alleging misrepresentation concerning services to be provided to lessees in a mobile home park, the North Carolina
Supreme Court gave the statute a broad reading and attempted to outline "what, as a matter of
law, makes a trade practice 'unfair or deceptive.'" Marshall, 302 N.C. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403.
Whether a trade practice is unfair or deceptive usually depends upon the facts of each
case and the impact the practice has in the marketplace. A practice is unfair when it
offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers. As also noted in Johnson, [300 N.C. at 265, 266 S.E.2d at 622,] under section 5 of the FTC Act, a practice is
deceptive if it has the capacity or tendency to deceive; proof of actual deception is not
required. Consistent with federal interpretations of decisions under Section 5, state
courts have generally ruled that the consumer need only show that an act or practice
possessed the tendency or capacity to mislead, or created the likelihood of deception, in
order to prevail under the states' unfair and deceptive practices act.
Id. The court concluded that "[u]nfairness and deception are gauged by consideration of the
effect of the practice on the marketplace. . . and the effect of the actors's conduct on the consuming public." 1d.
7. Morgan, The People'sAdvocate in the Marketplace-The Role of The North Carolina 4ttorney Generalin the Field of Consumer Protection, 6 WAKE FOREST ITrRA. L. REV. 1, 19 (1969).
8. Federal Trade Comm'n v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 312 (1934), (quoting Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931)). In Keppel, the Supreme Court
discussed the purpose of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce's rejection of a specific enumeration of acts deemed unfair. Id. at 310-12
nn.l-2.
9. In L.M. Hammers v. Lowe's Cos., 48 N.C. App. 150, 268 S.E.2d 257 (1980), Judge Parker
recognized the constitutional question but was not required to reach the issue on the record before
the court.
Admittedly, the language of [the] statute, proscribing as it does "[u]nfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
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treble damage provision to section 75-1.1 and the constitutional requirement
that a statute "convey sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices."' 0
The applicable standard for determining whether a given statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution depends on whether the statute
is penal or criminal and whether it is considered civil legislation or economic
regulation."I If the mandatory treble damages are judged by the standard applicable to penal statutes, the statute "must be sufficiently definite to give notice of the required conduct to one who would avoid its penalties, and to guide
the judge in its application and the lawyer in defending one charged with its
violation."' 2 If the statute is considered economic regulation and the
mandatory trebles predominantly remedial, however, "greater leeway is allowed,"1 3 and "[a] finding of vagueness will. . . result only where 'the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard ..
was so vague and indefinite as
or where . . . men of common
really to be no rule or standard at all,' .
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 14 Although the nature of the vagueness inquiry under these standards
and the ultimate decision whether the statute is "too vague" or "sufficiently
definite" to pass constitutional scrutiny is not readily apparent, the practical
effect of the selection of a given standard may be determinative.
Whether the stricter standard of definiteness applicable to penal statutes
should apply to the North Carolina statute depends on the legislative intent
behind section 75-1.1 and its effect on putative defendants. Section 75-1.1 was
enacted in response to a growing need for state legislation to supplement section 515 "so that local business interests could not proceed with impunity, seaffecting commerce," is extremely broad, so broad and vague, indeed, as to render the
triple damage penalty provided by G.S. 75-16 in a private action brought for violation of
the vague language of G.S. 75-1.1 at least of questionable validity. On the present record, however, we do not reach that constitutional question.
L.M. Hammers, 48 N.C. App. at 154, 268 S.E.2d at 259-60.
More recently, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
cited Judge Parker's skepticism and once again raised the issue. See Terry's Floor Fashions v.
Burlington Indus., 568 F. Supp. 205, 216 (E.D.N.C. 1983).
The North Carolina statute is vague, has been the subject of widely varying judicial
interpretations, and is of questionable constitutionality. The North Carolina appellate
courts have yet to provide a clear and consistent interpretation of the provisions of this
act. Indeed, defendants argue very persuasively that the act is unconstitutionally vague,
and at least one panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals has indicated its skepticism as to the constitutional validity of § 75-1.1.
Id. at 216. Because the court dismissed the action on jurisdictional grounds, the constitutional
question ivas not resolved.
10. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947).
11. See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
12. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952). See also United States v.
National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1963); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1947).
13. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
14. Horn v. Burns, 536 F.2d 251, 254 (8th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
15. Marshall,302 N.C. at 543, 276 S.E.2d at 400. See also Leaffer & Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfairor DeceptiveActs or Practices: The Private Uses of FederalTrade Commission
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cure in the knowledge that the dimensions of their transgressions would not
merit federal action."

16

Rather than placing the entire burden of business reg-

ulation on the Attorney General or creating a North Carolina commission to
enforce section 75-1.1, the general assembly decided to place primary respon-

siblity for the enforcement of the statute on private parties. Treble damages
were extended to claims under section 75-1.1 for the purposes of encouraging

private enforcement by making it economically feasible to bring an action in
which possible money damages were nominal, and increasing the incentive for
reaching a settlement.1 7 As such the private enforcement provisions are more
analogous to section 4 of the Clayton Act' s than section 5 of the Federal Trade

Commission Act.' 9
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Marshall v. Miller 20 considered
the purpose of the State's unfair and deceptive trade practices act 2 1 and the

role of the treble damage provision. 22 The court concluded that the
"[legislature intended to establish an effective private cause of action for aggrieved consumers in this State." 23 As such, the court reiterated its earlier
characterization of 75-16 as a "hybrid."
[I]t is an oversimplification to characterize G.S. 75-16 as punitive.
Jurisprudence, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv.521 (1980). The various state consumer protection acts
passed during the 1960s and 1970s to supplement § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act "had
their genesis in various forms suggested to the states by the Federal Trade Commission." Id. at
521 n.2. See generally Lovett, State Deceptive TradePracticesLegislation, 46 TULANE L. REv. 724,
730-31 (1972); Lovett, Private Actionsfor Deceptive Trade Practices, 23 AD. L. REv. 271, 275
(1970); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION C4-C5 (1970).

16. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 549, 276 S.E.2d at 403.
17. Id. at 550, 276 S.E.2d at 403-04. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 14950 (1978); Comment, Consumer Protectionand Unfair Competition in North Carolina-The 1969
Legisiation, 48 N.C.L. REv. 896, 900 (1970).
It could be argued that the incentive provided by treble damages is not needed in the context
of an unfair-methods-of-competition claim, and thus that this component should not be subject to
mandatory treble damages. Because the plaintiffs and the defendants in an unfair-methods-ofcompetition claim usually are competing businessmen and the amount in controversy is likely to
be greater than an unfair-or-deceptive-acts-or-practices claim, the plaintiff has more incentive to
bring a private action whether or not treble damages are available. This view, however, ignores
the small businessman whose actual damages, like the consumer, might be small relative to the
sales revenues of his larger competitor or supplier. The existence of an effective private cause of
action may mean the difference between continued operations or bankruptcy. Moreover, the continuing "unfair methods of competition" may have a secondary effect, effectively passing on the
damage to the ultimate consumer in the form of higher prices or misleading advertising. Thus,
under the better view, both components of § 75-1.1 and the corresponding treble damage provisions should be viewed as part of a broader scheme to maintain the legitimacy and integrity of
competition and ethical standards in the marketplace.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). Section 15 provides:
[Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States
in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
19. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 542, 276 S.E.2d at 399. See also Survey of North CarolinaLaw,
1980-CommercialLaw, 59 N.C.L. REv. 1070, 1073 (1981).
20. 302 N.C. 539, 276 S.E.2d 397 (1981).
21. Id. at 543, 549-50, 276 S.E.2d at 400, 403-04.
22. Id. at 546-47, 276 S.E.2d at 403-04.
23. Id. at 543, 276 S.E.2d at 400.
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The statute is partially punitive in nature in that it clearly serves as a
deterrent to future violations. But it is also remedial for other reasons, among them the fact that it encourages private enforcement
and the fact that it provides a remedy for aggrieved parties. It is, in
effect, a hybrid. 24
Whereas the legislature's primary focus appears to be remedial, the effect on a
defendant convicted for a violation of section 75-1.1 is more akin to a penalty.25 The individual defendant is not concerned whether his treble damage
payment is exacted for the remedial purpose of maintaining fair and ethical
standards of competition or for the purpose of punishing his past transgressions; he cares only that his liability is three times the actual damages proved
by the plaintiff. Since there is no limit to the treble damage award, putative
defendants
face enormous potential liability and the possibility of financial
26
ruin.
In light of these conflicting views concerning the nature of the treble damage provision as applied to section 75-1.1, it is important to consider the application of the remedy by the North Carolina courts and the federal courts'
interpretation of the similar treble damage provision under the federal antitrust laws. In Marshallthe supreme court rejected defendants' contention that
bad faith was an essential element of a section 75-1.1 treble damage claim .27
This holding follows directly from the court's conclusion that "unfairness and
deception are gauged by consideration of the effect of the practice on the marketplace," 28 and supports the "remedial" purpose of the statute. If, for example, the statute primarily was punitive or penal in nature, the treble damage
remedy would be inappropriate in actions asserting an unwitting violation of
section 75-1.1. Since the defendant would not have been aware that his business practices were in violation of the statute, he could not have taken steps to
comply with the statutory proscriptions. Thus, the Marshall holding supports
the "remedial" nature of section 75-16.29
24. Id. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402.
25. See Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 367, 376 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), rev'd, 606
S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980). See also Note, Unfair Trade Practicesand Unfair Methods of Competition in North Carolina: Are Both Treble andPunitive Damages Availablefor Violations of Section

75-LIZ 62 N.C.L. REv. 1139 (1984).
26. See Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d at 376, rev'd, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980).
27. 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 401.
28. Id. at 548, 276 S.E.2d at 403. Marshallinvolved a consumer challenge under the unfairor-deceptive-acts-or-practices component. .A similar "effect-on-the-marketplace" test was espoused by the court of appeals with reference to the unfair-methods-of-competition component in
Harrington Mfg. Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 38 N.C. App. 393, 248 S.E.2d 739 (1978), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 411, 251 S.E.2d 469 (1979).
Unfair competition has been referred to in terms of conduct "which a court of equity
would consider unfair." Extract Co. v. Ray, 221 N.C. 269, 273, 20 S.E.2d 59, 61 (1942).
Thus viewed, the fairness or unfairness of particular conduct is not an abstraction to be
derived by logic. Rather, the fair or unfair nature of particular conduct is to be judged
* . . by determining its intended and actual effects upon others.
Id. at 400, 248 S.E.2d at 744.
29. This distinction is clarified by § 75-15.2, which provides for a civil penalty at the discretion of the presiding judge if certain specified conditions are satisfied. By making the penalty
rovisions for § 75-15.2 discretionary and maintaining the mandatory treble damages provision,
the legislature has indicated the disparate purposes and functions of these sections. See Holley v.
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Further support for the proposition that the paramount concern of the
treble damages provision is maintenance of the integrity of the marketplace
rather than punishment of past violations is found in the federal courts' interpretations of the nature of the federal, antitrust, treble damages under the
Clayton Act.30 In Pfizer, Inc. v. India3 l the United States Supreme Court
noted that, "[iin light of the law's expansive remedial purpose, the Court has
not taken a technical or semantic approach in determining who is a 'person'
entitled to sue for treble damages,"'32 and reiterated its previous conclusion
that the provision had two purposes: "to deter violators and deprive them of
'the fruits of their illegality' and to compensate victims of antitrust violations
for their injuries." 33 As such, the great majority of the courts have held that
the primary purpose of this provision is compensatory and remedial. 34 Thus,
the plaintiff is
representing not only his personal interests, but the public inter35
est as well.
A number of decisions in Texas and Illinois support the conclusion that
the treble damage provision is primarily remedial. In Singleton v. Pennington36 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court
Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 229, 237-38, 259 S.E.2d 1, 6-7, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 806,
261 S.E.2d 919 (1979).
30. Prior to the enactment of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1980), § 75-16 provided for treble
damages for violation of § 75-1, North Carolina's "little Sherman act." As such, § 75-16 was
modeled after the federal, antitrust, treble damage provision, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1984). Logic dictates
that the decision to incorporate § 75-1.1 in Chapter 75 of the General Statutes in 1969, and therefore subject § 75-1.1 violations to mandatory treble damages (note the wording and operation of
§ 75-16), indicated that the purpose of the treble damage provision as applied to § 75-1.1 was
identical to the purpose as applied to § 75-1. Otherwise the same statutory provision would have
divergent purposes, depending on which section was violated.
31. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
32. Id. at 313.
33. Id. at 314. See also American Soe'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
556 (1982); Former Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
34. See Wolf Sales Co. v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 105 F. Supp. 506, 509 (D. Colo. 1952) and
cases cited therein. Also, in John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495 (9th Cir.
1977), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit summarized the nature of the
treble damages.
On the other hand, § 4 is basically a remedial provision. It provides treble damages
to "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws.." While § 4 does play an important part in penalizing and deterring wrongdoing, ..
it was designed primarily as a remedy.
Id. at 498 (citations omitted). See also Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-Trust Act
Penalor Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L.J. 117, 147-59 (1940).
In Herald Co. v. Harper, 410 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit was faced with an action to enjoin the operation of the Clayton Act's treble
damages provision. Plaintiff alleged ten separate constitutional infirmities with the provision.
Herald Co. v. Harper, 293 F. Supp. 1101, 1102 n.1 (E.D. Mo. 1968). The court dismissed the
action "for want of a substantial constitutional question," Herald Co., 410 F.2d at 131, and thus
rejected plaintiff's contention that the provision should be treated as if it were a criminal statute.
The court stated that, "[a]ssuming arguendo that the statute is punitive in nature, 'this is not
enough to label it as a criminal statute,' to which all the constitutional safeguards of a criminal
proceeding attach." Id. at 130.
35. See Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276, 279-80 (9th Cir. 1976). This view has
been expressed with regard to N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-1.1, 75-16 (1981) by a commentator. See
Comment, supra note 17, at 900.
36. 568 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), rev'd, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980).
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considered the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act 37 in the context of an

"innocent misrepresentation by a seller of second-hand goods who [was] not in
the business of selling such goods." 38 The court of civil appeals rejected plain-

tiff's contention that the statute was remedial rather than punitive 39 and stated
that "[flrom the point of view of the seller, any exaction over and above that
necessary to compensate the buyer for his loss is punitive."40 Because of this

punitive element and the potential for draconian liability, especially in the
context of class actions, the court of appeals applied the "due process requirement applicable to criminal penalties." 4 1 To construe the statute to comport
with the due process standard of reasonable notice, the court interpreted the

act to require a showing of intent to deceive. 42

On appeal, however, the Texas Supreme Court overruled the court of

civil appeals and construed the statute as remedial economic regulation. 43 Although the court noted that "[t]he fact that a statute limits punishment to acts

done 'knowingly' or requires specific intent as a prerequisite to punishment
has been given weight by courts rejecting challenges made on the ground of

vagueness," 44 the court concluded that the requirement of specific intent
45
merely would make the statute more restricted, not necessarily more specific.
In Scott v. Associationfor Childbirth at Home 4 6 defendant contended that
section 2 of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act

was unconstitutionally vague because it affected rights protected by the first
and fourteenth amendments and because it was a penal statute. 47 Although

the statute did not provide for multiple damages, a civil penalty of up to
$50,000 could be imposed. 48 The court applied the economic regulation

37. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41 to .63 (Vernon Supp. 1977).
38. Singleton, 568 S.W.2d at 369.
39. Id. at 376. At the time of this case, the Texas statute provided for mandatory treble
damages. See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (rex. 1977). The Texas statute declared that
"[flalse, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce," were
unlawful. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(a) (Vernon Supp. 1977). Subsection (b) enumerated a "laundry list" of specific violations in addition to the general proscription of§ 17.46(a).
The court of civil appeals addressed the constitutional claim in Singleton under the assumption
that defendant was not guilty of a § 17.46(a) per se violation, but was guilty only under the
§ 17A6(a) "umbrella" provision. But see infra note 43.
40. Singleton, 568 S.W.2d at 376.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 381.
43. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980). The Texas Supreme Court concluded that defendant violated two of the specified per se violations enumerated in TEx. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1977), and that, therefore, it did not have to decide
whether the language of § 17.46(a) was unconstitutionally vague. Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 688.
Since the same treble damages provision was being applied, however, the supreme court's rejection of the court of civil appeals' characterization of the effect of the statute as primarily penal is
applicable equally to § 17.46(a).
44. Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 689.
45. Id. The court added that "[ilt is unquestionably true that deception is more reprehensible
when done intentionally and that liability for treble damages is less harsh when intent is present.
The necessity or reasonableness of specific enactments, however, is a matter of legislative discretion." Id. at 689-90.
46. 88 Ill. 2d 279, 430 N.E.2d 1012 (1981).
47. Id. at 285-86, 430 N.E.2d at 1016.
48. Id. at 288, 430 N.E.2d at 1017.
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vagueness standard and held that the terms " 'unfair methods of competition'
and 'unfair acts or practices' have a sufficiently definite and well-established
49
meaning to overcome the allegation of vagueness."
The general assembly's intent in enacting section 75-1.1 and the corresponding treble damages provision make it apparent that the primary purpose
of the North Carolina scheme is economic regulation. Both the state and federal courts have recognized that although the treble damages remedy is partially punitive, 50 the statute is not penal.5 1 Although the statute can be
interpreted as punitive from the standpoint of the defendant who is forced to
pay a damage award exceeding the amount necessary to compensate the plaintiff,52 the remedial and private enforcement objectives of section 75-16 cannot
be ignored.5 3 Thus, the proper "fair notice" test required by the due process
requirement of the fourteenth amendment is the test applied to regulatory statutes governing business activity. Because North Carolina's statute is primarily
for economic regulation, the courts should not invalidate the statute on the
grounds of vagueness unless it does not convey "sufficiently definite warning
as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
'5 4
practices."
The determination of whether section 75-1.1 is unconstitutionally vague
in light of the mandatory treble damage remedy must begin with sound principles of statutory construction. Since section 75-1.1 does not implicate constitutionally protected first amendment freedom,5 5 the statute must be interpreted
in light of the facts of each particular case. 56 Furthermore, acts of the legisla49. Id. at 290-91, 430 N.E.2d at 1018.
50. See supra notes 24 and 33 and accompanying text.

51. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402; Holley v. Coggin Pontiac, Inc., 43 N.C.

App. 229, 237-39, 259 S.E.2d 1, 6-7, disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 806, 261 S.E.2d 919 (1979). See
also United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 485 F. Supp. 1049, 1058 n.5 (E.D.N.C. 1980),
aftd, 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981).
52. See Singleton, 568 S.W.2d at 376.

53. See Marshall, 302 N.C. at 546, 276 S.E.2d at 402; Holley, 43 N.C. App. at 237-39, 259
S.E.2d at 6-7.

54. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
55. See Scott, 88 Ill. 2d 279, 285-88, 430 N.E.2d 1012, 1015-17 (1981).

[The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the first amendment is not a bar to
State regulation prohibiting false, misleading or deceptive commercial speech. "By definition, commercial speech is linked inextricably to commercial activity: while the First

Amendment affords such speech 'a limited measure of protection,' it is also true that 'the
State does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the
public whenever speech is a component of that activity.'" Thus the investigation and

regulation of unfair or deceptive business practices under the Act does not, because it
cannot, impinge upon constitutionally protected speech. Since the Act prohibits only
such speech as amounts to a fraudulent or deceptive practice, te., false or misleading

advertising, it can affect only speech that is by definition outside the ambit of first
amendment protection, and within the scope of permissible State regulation.
Id. at 287, 430 N.E.2d at 1016 (citations omitted).
56. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975). See also United States v. Na-

tional Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1963); State v. Covington, 34 N.C. App. 457, 460,
238 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1977).
In NationalDairy the Supreme Court repeated the distinction between vagueness challenges
to statutes that arise under the first amendment and those concerning economic regulation.
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ture are presumed to be constitutional 5

7

and therefore, "statutes are not auto-

matically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found 5 in
8
determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language."
Although section 75-1.1 admittedly is phrased in broad language, it is not

so vague as to be no rule or standard at all 59 or so indefinite as to require "men
of common intelligence...

[to] guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-

cation."' 60 When section 75-1.1 was enacted the phrases "unfair methods of
competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" had a long history of

case-by-case interpretation under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. The North Carolina courts have stated repeatedly that Federal Trade

Commission decisions and judicial interpretations of section 5 may be used as
a guide in determining the scope and meaning of the statute. 6 1 In addition,

claims under section 75-1.1 must be construed with reference to the numerous
legislative inclusions that have been added as per se violations since

1969.62

Given section 75-16's remedial purpose and role in the maintenance of ethical
standards of fair dealing in the marketplace, there is no reason to treat sections

75-1.1 and 75-16 differently than section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act for the purpose of a vagueness challenge. Thus, the opinion of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
FederalTrade Commission63 is equally relevant to the North Carolina scheme.
[T]he phrase [unfair methods of competition] is no more indefinite

than "due process of law." The general idea of that phrase as it appears in constitutions and statutes is quite well known; but we have
never encountered what purported to be an all-embracing schedule

or found a specific definition that would bar the continuing processes
of judicial inclusion and exclusion based on accumulating experi-

ence. If the expression, "unfair methods of competition," is too uncertain for use, then under the same condemnation would fall the
In this connection we also note that the approach to "vagueness" governing a case
like this is different from that followed in cases arising under the First Amendment.
There we are concerned with the vagueness of the statute "on its face" because such
vagueness may in itself deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable conduct.
No such factor is present here where the statute is directed only at conduct designed to
destroy competition, activity which is neither constitutionally protected nor socially desirable. We are thus permitted to consider the warning provided by § 3 not only in terms
of the statute "on its face" but also in the light of the conduct to which it is applied.
NationalDairy,372 U.S. at 36.

57. See Mitchell v. Financing Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 144, 159 S.E.2d 745, 750 (1968). See also
NationalDairy, 372 U.S. at 32.

58. NationalDairy, 372 U.S. at 32. The constitutionality of the Sherman Act was upheld by
the Supreme Court in Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913), against an attack on vagueness
grounds. Mr. Justice Holmes' oft-quoted remark is particularly relevant in this instance. "[T]he
law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury
subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong not only may he incur
a fine or a short imprisonment ... ; he may incur the penalty of death." Id. at 377.
59. See A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925).
60. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See Horn v. Bums, 536 F.2d
251, 254 (8th Cir. 1976).
61. Marshall, 302 N.C. at 542, 276 S.E.2d at 399.
62. See supra note I and accompanying text.
63. 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919).
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innumerable statutes which predicate rights and prohibitions upon
"unsound mind," "undue influence," "unfaithfulness," "unjust discrimination," and the like. This statute is remedial and orders to
desist are civil; but even in criminal law convictions are upheld on
statutory prohibitions of "rebates or concessions," or of "schemes to
defraud," without any schedule of acts or specific definition of forbidden conduct, thus leaving the courts free to condemn new and
64
ingenious ways that were unknown when the statutes were enacted.
Although it is conceivable that a given interpretation could make the statute unconstitutionally vague, 65 section 75-1.1 as applied is sufficiently definite
to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Given the predominantly remedial purpose of section 75-16 and the extensive body of law that has developed under
the aegis of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, section 75-1.1 is
no more vague than many of the other terms which the law has accepted,
interpreted, and refined over the years. Although commentators and defendants might quarrel with the necessity and reasonableness of the treble damages
provision 66 or prefer a different formulation of the definition of an unfair
trade practice, these considerations are a matter of legislative discretion.
GLENN CARSTEN CAMPBELL

64. Id. at 311.
65. If, for example, the North Carolina courts were to extend N.C. GEN. STAr. § 75-1.1
(1981) and the treble damages of § 75-16 to a simple breach of contract between two private
citizens not engaged in business for profit, it is conceivable that § 75-1.1 and the mandatory treble
damage provision of § 75-16 would be deemed unconstitutionally vague as applied.
66. See Aycock, supra note I, at 264. Professor Aycock notes that "the treble damage provision might be a double-edged sword." Id. at 223.

